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Diplomatic ties predict BIT-adoption This first section begins from a simple observation: a number of quantitative analyses have found diplomatic representation to be correlated with investment treaty adoption between two states. 7 Even after controlling for investment flows and other potential drivers of investment treaties, diplomatic representation between countries still remains key for their propensity to adopt BITs with each other. This is potentially important. Diplomatic representation is a core proxy for whether two countries have established, or seek to establish, political links with each other, which could have driven some BITs -as in the case of the UK and Romania for
instance.
Yet, the relationship between diplomatic representation and investment treaty adoption has not been reflected upon to date. Allee and Peinhardt refer the result to a footnote with no explanation, and Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons (EGS) don't consider diplomatic representation as a substantially interesting predictor in itself either. We suspect the papers have thereby overlooked a core implication of their own results.
That said; there are good reasons to be suspicious that the effect of diplomatic representation on BIT-adoption is driven by a range of other factors not controlled for in the calculations. As a first step for our paper, the following section will therefore show that diplomatic links are, in fact, a highly important and robust predictor of investment treaty adoption, and use a set of complementary tests with another proxy for diplomatic links to provide evidence which suggests the identified relationship is at least partially a causal one.
Diplomatic representations
As in previous papers, our proxy for diplomatic links is the indicator of formal diplomatic representation from the Correlates of War of War Diplomatic Exchange Data Set (version 2006.1) . Given the benefits of diplomatic representation -such as information gathering, effective communication, international prestige, and promotion of economic and political interests 8 -states should have an interest in opening up missions in most countries. Yet, establishing diplomatic missions is costly 9 and there is therefore significant spatial and 7 Allee and Peinhardt 2010, ftn. 37; Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006. 8 Kinne 2014; Keeley 2000. 9 In 2014, the United States spent $8 billion on diplomatic and consular programs and $2.6 billion on embassy security, construction, and maintenance; Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification: Fiscal Year 2016". Similar levels are evident in our data as can be seen in Table 1 . As a starting point, Figure 1 Peer effects in the JHM model are captured via a weighted average of the total number of BITs signed by peers. This variable is thus analogous to the competition variable, except that it captures general propensity to participate in BITs, rather than the propensity to sign a BIT with the particular source in the dyad. Again, the weightings applied reflect either trade, language, colonial history, or IGO-membership similarity to the host. In order to ensure that these variables do not inadvertently capture the effect of the direct peer relationship between source and host, the corresponding direct bilateral measures are also included in each regression.
Finally, our specification is slightly more conservative than that of JHM. We include year dummies rather than just period dummies, dummies for both soviet and former soviet states, and we run the regression separately for each of the three periods they identify. The magnitude of the predicted effects of diplomatic representation are also of note. The hazard ratio for dyads with and without diplomatic representation varies from around nine in the first period, to just over five in the final period. This means that in the first period, the rate of BIT formation was nine times higher for pairs with diplomatic representation than for those without. The only variable which had a greater effect on BIT formation in any period was if the source country was Soviet at the time and the only variables which had a similar magnitude of effect are the various constructs from combinations of host and source GDPs (whose magnitudes are likely overblown due to collinearity problems). Table 2 suggests diplomatic representation is an important and robust determinant of BIT formation.
The results are essentially unchanged regardless of the measure of competition or peer effects used. We demonstrate this robustness in Table 3 by reporting the results for diplomatic representation in regressions in which all the JHM variables are included simultaneously. We do not report the effects of the full set of controls in the interest of saving space, and because they show an erratic pattern due to collinearity with each other. The results in Table 3 show that adding more controls tends to increase the observed correlation between diplomatic ties and BIT formation. Table 3 : Strong positive effect of diplomatic representation on BIT formation is robust to inclusion of all controls simultaneously.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Hazard ratio compares instantaneous likelihood of BIT formation with and without diplomatic representation. A hazard ratio greater than one indicates and increase in the likelihood of BIT formation. Results for full set of controls available on request from authors.
Despite the strength of the relationship between diplomatic representation and BIT formation, however, there remains one concern which needs to be addressed before we can claim that diplomatic ties actually cause higher rates of BIT formation in and of themselves. This concern is that economic drivers -such as source country investors wishing to access the host country -may increase both the likelihood of diplomatic representation and the probability of BIT formation. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Hazard ratio compares instantaneous likelihood of BIT formation for 1-std. dev. increase in continuous controls, or for change from 0 to 1 for binary controls. A hazard ratio greater than one indicates and increase in the likelihood of BIT formation. capabilities -seem to have been important for patterns of BIT-adoption, but only when there was diplomatic representation that gave diplomats greater opportunity to initiate negotiations. Finally, the right-hand columns in Table 5 again report the results of estimations which cover both periods 2 and 3, but they differ depending on whether the host country has been subject to a BIT-claim. Poulsen 
Causal mechanisms
The core finding from the previous section is that diplomatic links and motivations are strong predictors for investment treaty adoption. Yet, our quantitative analysis says little about the actual causal mechanism underlying this correlation and previous quantitative work that identified a relationship between BIT-adoption and diplomatic links also ignored the potential drivers. The qualitative evidence in this section addresses this gap. We categorise the identified mechanisms broadly in two categories: a wish to strengthen diplomatic ties; and the desire to obtain diplomatic perks.
Diplomatic ties
The first mechanism is well-known in international relations literature. Economic agreements are not just signed for commercial reasons, but also to promote or tie in foreign policy objectives. In the trade regime, for instance, Gowa and Mansfield have shown that security alliances partly shape patterns of trade flows and preferential trade agreements (PTAs).
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The linking of PTA-adoption to broader foreign-policy agendas has also been a theme in country-specific literature on the US 24 and Japan, 25 for instance, as well as on-going discussions of mega-regional agreements, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership.
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The argument should not be taken too far as one can point to a range of important cases of economic diplomacy where commercial objectives trumped security and other foreign policy objectives. 27 Also, the parallel with BITs is not one-to-one as PTAs are less widespread but more politicized than BITs and thus more likely to be associated with significant political rewards. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that economic agreements can be driven by noneconomic motives. In the context of the investment regime the following paragraphs will show that Salacuse is right to note that, 23 Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Mansfield 1993; Gowa 1994. 24 See e.g. Feinberg 2003 . 25 Ravenhill 2008. 26 See e.g. Hamilton and Blocmans 2015. 27 See e.g. Odell 2000, 43-44, 95-197. In the context of investment disputes, Maurer (2014) shows that American multinationals often managed to force the hand of the executive branch during the 20 th century leading the American government into investment disputes at the expense of broader foreign policy concerns. American BIT-negotiator, the "treaty seemed quite clearly an attempt to signal that the U.S.
invasion had been a success and that conditions for foreign investments in Grenada now were favourable." 38 In short, Washington's policy was not just to adopt BITs to protect American capital abroad, but also "to accomplish political objectives." 39 Chilton has thus also found that economic factors were relatively unimportant to predict US BIT adoption compared to political motivations.
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American BITs were not the only treaties used for strategic political purposes. In Denmark, for instance, several BITs were also explicitly framed as part of broader foreign policy goals.
As an example, the 1991 agreement with Czechoslovakia was not just initiated to promote commercial links but also part of "the broader Danish initiatives to support the reform process in central-and eastern European countries". 41 Equally, when the agreement with Albania was signed in 1995 -upon Albania's suggestion -it was presented at the ceremony not "only as an economic instrument but certainly as an indicator of our wish to further strengthen the ties Diplomatic relationships were also brought into play during negotiations. In negotiations with Turkey, several Danish authorities objected to the initial deal negotiated by the Danish Foreign Ministry. 45 The Central Bank and the Economic Council found the transfer clause objectionable as the Turks wanted exceptions for balance-of-payments difficulties. After this was settled in a new draft the Danish Foreign ministry was ready to sign, yet new objections came in from the Ministry of Industry, who now objected to the dispute settlement clause.
The fork-in-the-road provision included a one-year waiting period, to which the Ministry objected (despite the fact that Danish industrial groups had said Danish firms never raised ICSID claims anyway and that it therefore probably didn't matter in practise). In response, the Danish Foreign ministry responded in internal files that any further delay would be unfortunate "due to the broader relationship with Turkey". 46 While a 'stronger' dispute settlement clause could maybe have been negotiated, the political relationship was more important to keep in mind. That settled the matter and the draft passed.
In other cases, the diplomatic dimension was even more explicit, most notably for the numerous investment treaties signed merely as 'photo-ops' with little, if any, commercial compared with free trade agreements, 55 they were nevertheless useful for diplomats to display international co-operation and goodwill. Using BITs as "photo-ops" is of course a much more haphazard approach to investment treaty negotiations than the American "grand strategy", but the aim was similar: sign investment treaties to promote, or cement, diplomatic ties.
Diplomatic perks
Our second causal mechanism relates to individual incentives for diplomats. This is an understudied area of international economic negotiations. While most work on economic diplomacy draws heavily on classic works in economics and public policy dealing with interest formation and aggregation, 56 surprisingly little scholarship engages with insights from public choice literature on how bureaucrats seek to maximise their own individual welfare. 57 Abbott, for instance, notes that officials may use international governance frameworks to "enhance their power and budgets at home", but lament the absence of literature on this question. 58 Yet, any understanding of international economic agreements is incomplete without appreciating the incentives of the bureaucrats and regulators negotiating them.
In the context of the investment treaty regime, a bureaucratic-politics perspective would suggest that diplomats' own interests in promoting investment treaties could be important and partly explain our quantitative findings. 59 In addition to our general findings on the importance of diplomatic links, it could also explain why diplomatic representation was already a significant predictor of BIT formation prior to 1988 -at a time when we do not find evidence that traditional diplomatic motives (measured by military personnel per capita) were a driver of BITs. In most cases Government-sponsored foreign travels, be it for negotiation of treaties or other matters, are seen as opportunities for government officials as avenues to obtain personal benefits in terms of travel allowances and visit rather than related to the purpose and subject matter of the travel. Such travels are mostly preceded by internal "fights" among officials and among officials and their subordinates. Hence, it
is not unusual to see political appointees rather than experts in meetings, workshops, conferences or negotiation forums. Sometimes top officials of the government having a power to sign treaties may end up signing BITs the negotiations of which has still been underway without assuming any responsibility or accountability for their acts. 67 Another set of bureaucratic actors gaining private benefits from investment treaties are embassies and embassy staff. In South Africa, one official notes about the BIT-adoption strategy of the 1990s and early 2000s that: "The ambassadors used them as a possible achievement during their tenure, so we had requests from embassies all the time to sign these agreements." 68 Another official concurs that embassies: "like photo-sessions and smiles, so they love to have a minister to come and sign an agreement, no matter how small the country" 69 In Ghana, as well, new ambassadors were always briefed on BITs and DTTs as instruments of economic diplomacy and according to the architect of Ghana's BIT program, the ambassadors "used this information and saw the treaties as an indicator of their performance." 70 These dynamics are not isolated to Africa. In Ecuador, for instance, some
Ambassadors are reported to have initiated the treaties at the end of their posting to "finish with a bang." 71 Occasionally, developed country parties would even tell Ecuadorian embassies that they didn't find any justification for the Ecuadorian initiative to negotiate BITs. 72 Another Latin American bureaucrat notes that if your job is related to economic diplomacy and international negotiations, "you need to justify your work, so you will push for these treaties no matter how redundant they may appear."
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This feedback suggests that one of the drivers of our quantitative findings relates to the individual incentives of diplomats to push for BITs. That said; it is important to stress that just as some countries are more likely to have used BITs for diplomatic perks than others, there is also bound to be variation over time. After the rise of investment arbitration, there is a growing realization among governments in the developing world that investment treaties can involve significant costs and it has therefore become more difficult for diplomats to push for 
Conclusion
This paper has assessed the importance of diplomatic considerations for the investment treaty regime. Both quantitative evidence at the macro-level and qualitative evidence at the micro-level suggests that this is an important, and overlooked, driver of BIT-adoption.
Our first causal mechanism is well-known from other literatures: foreign policy considerations drive treaty-making. We have shown this mechanism was at work in the investment treaty regime. Our second mechanism is novel, since it focuses on the individual incentives of diplomats. We suspect this finding could be important also for other areas of international economic relations. Buchanan once noted that political scientists need to replace "romantic and illusory set of notions about the workings of governments and the behaviour of persons who govern [with] notions that embody more scepticism." 75 Our paper offers an illustration that perhaps a healthy degree of scepticism about the interests of economic diplomats could be useful to better understand the design and effects of global economic regimes.
We have not touched on a third causal mechanism that could be important, namely the role of diplomatic socialisation. 76 Among OECD countries, bureaucrats routinely meet in Paris to coordinate and discuss investment treaty policy-making, whereas the primary forum for developing countries is UNCTAD in Geneva. The extent to which these and other forums have impacted the investment treaty regime through diplomatic mimicking, social influence, and persuasion could be an important subject for future studies. 75 Buchanan 1979. 76 See generally Johnston 2001.
